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“I have had dreams and I have had nightmares, but I have 








The symbiosis between dream and nightmare now seems to be playing out 
with regard to the Internet. Some two decades ago, it was possible to dream 
about the benevolence of the Internet as “a fast-growing emblem of national 
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1 This quotation is attributed without clear foundation to Jonas Salk, who can certainly claim to have 
developed his dream of a successful polio vaccine. Did Jonas Salk say “I have had dreams and I have 
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propagation and sale of ideas, goods and services on a global scale.”2 Everyone 
could dream of the Internet as a harbinger of progress, with slogans such as 
“[t]he information wants to be free”3 and directions to authorities that “You are 
not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.”4 
Surprisingly, the authorities in the West responded sympathetically and 
entrenched in law the supportive notion that communications service providers 
(CSPs) are content-neutral pipelines rather than content controllers. This stance 
is reflected in the United States’ Communications Decency Act5 and the 
European Union’s E-Commerce Directive.6 Such policies reflect an optimistic 
desire to foster Internet growth by encouraging investment and innovation. 
However, the optimism is now beset by risks, abuses, and scares that have 
taken the gloss off the promise of the Internet and the indulgence afforded to 
Internet operators. The exploitation of private information for commercial 
profit7 and tax avoidance, form part of the nightmares,8 leading to further 
reproaches about unfair competition within the digital sector,9 and from offline 
retailers,10 and media outlets.11 Next, the Internet of Things (IoT) promises to 
enhance everyday objects but also connects to an IoT platform, so that “the 
resulting data continuously flows into big data at every node.”12 Ordinary objects 
become “smart objects” with the capability of actively participating in business 




2 CLIVE WALKER, DAVID WALL & YAMAN AKDENIZ, THE INTERNET, LAW AND SOCIETY 3 (2000). 
3 R. Polk Wagner, Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control Essay, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
995, 999 n.14 (2003) (attributing the quote to Stewart Brand in 1984). See also McKenzie Wark, 
Information Wants to Be Free (But Is Everywhere in Chains), 20 CULTURAL STUD. 165, 173 (2006); 
CORY DOCTOROW, INFORMATION DOESN’T WANT TO BE FREE: LAWS FOR THE INTERNET AGE (2014). 
4 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence. 
5 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996). See also David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An 
Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373 (2010). On liability for threats and terrorism incitements, see Michelle Roter, With 
Great Power Comes Great Responsibility: Imposing a “Duty to Take Down” Terrorist Incitement on 
Social Media, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1381 (2017); Jaime M. Freilich, Note, Section 230’s Liability 
Shield in the Age of Online Terror Recruitment, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 675, 678 (2018). 
6 Council Directive on Electronic Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 11–12 (EC). See also ARNO R. 
LODDER & ANDREW D. MURRAY, EU REGULATION OF E-COMMERCE: A COMMENTARY (Elgar 
Comment. Series, 2017); JANE K. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 
(4th ed. 2019). 
7 See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN 
FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019). 
8 See COMM. OF PUB. ACCOUNTS, REPORT ON TAX AVOIDANCE–GOOGLE, 2012-13, HC 112 (UK); 
HM TREASURY, CORP. TAX AND THE DIGITAL ECON.: POSITION PAPER, 2017 (UK). 
9 THE DIGITAL COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION, 2019 (UK). 
10 HOUSE OF COMMONS HOUSING, COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOV’T COMM., HIGH STREETS AND 
TOWN CENTRES IN 2030, 2017-19, HC 1010 (UK). 
11 See CLIVE WALKER & RUSSELL L. WEAVER, FREE SPEECH IN AN INTERNET ERA (2013); 
CAIRNCROSS REV., A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE FOR JOURNALISM (2019), https://assets.publishing. 
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/778021/021119_THE_CAIR
NCROSS_REVIEW_A_sustainable_future_for_journalism.pdf. 
12 Giuseppe Russo et al., Exploring Regulations and Scope of the Internet of Things in Contemporary 
Companies: A First Literature Analysis, 4 J. INNOVATION & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 11 (2015); The term 
“IoT encompasses everything connected to the internet, but it is increasingly being used to define objects 
that ‘talk’ to each other.” Matt Burgess, What is the Internet of Things? WIRED Explains, WIRED (Feb. 
16, 2018), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/internet-of-things-what-is-explained-iot. 
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combatants with high-tech combat gear embedded with biometric wearables.14 
Security and privacy are nightmares for IoT’s consumers, because smart objects 
can generate and store data,15 which are then susceptible to denial-of-service 
attacks, ransomware attacks, and hacking attacks that use malware.16 All the 
“online harms” that allegedly arise17 were the subject of a recent U.K. 
government discussion paper with that title.18 Among the twenty-three listed 
harms are: pornography and indecency, terrorism,19 harassment and 
intimidation, hatred, dangerous, unregulated, or untaxed goods, and 
disinformation (including fake news). Some aspects, such as the impacts on 
elections20 and disinformation,21 have been taken up by further inquiries. 
Broader unsavoury aspects, such as threats to privacy (notably, the misdeeds of 
Cambridge Analytica and Facebook), are less clearly identified, but certainly 
have been condemned by the U.K. Information Commissioner.22 
This Online Harms agenda is the stuff of nightmares, especially as aspects 
go beyond existing criminality and create the further nightmare of the 
government as the arbiter of truth.23 The targets of the Online Harms document 
primarily comprise a domestic agenda and do not encompass the external threat 
of transnational cyberattacks, which is the subject of this paper. The reason for 
silence about transnational cyberattacks in the Online Harms document relates 
to bureaucratic demarcations in the U.K. administration. Other existential 
nightmares are tackled in a different set of documentation, namely the current 




14 Lori Cameron, Internet of Things Meets the Military and Battlefield: Connecting Gear and 
Biometric Wearables for an IoMT and IoBT, IEEE COMPUTER SOC’Y, https://www.computer.org/ 
publications/tech-news/research/Internet-of-military-battlefield-things-iomt-iobt (last visited Aug. 20, 
2019). 
15 Rolf H. Weber & Evelyne Studer, Cybersecurity in the Internet of Things: Legal Aspects, 32 
COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 715, 721 (2016). 
16 ROLF H. WEBER & ROMANA WEBER, INTERNET OF THINGS: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 44 (2009); Ibrar 
Yaqoob et al., The Rise of Ransomware and Emerging Security Challenges in the Internet of Things, 129 
COMPUTER NETWORKS: INT’L J. COMPUTER & TELECOMM. NETWORKING 444, 445 (2017). 
17 See Julia Davidson et al., Adult Online Hate, Harassment and Abuse: A Rapid Evidence 
Assessment, U.K. COUNCIL FOR INTERNET SAFETY (June 2019), https://assets.publishing. 
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/811450/Adult_Online_Harms
_Report_2019.pdf. 
18 HM GOV’T, WHITE PAPER ON ONLINE HARMS, 2019, CP, 57 ¶ 2.2. (UK). See also HOUSE OF 
COMMONS DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMM. WHITE PAPER ON ONLINE HARMS, 2017-19, 
HC 2431 (UK). 
19 See also COMM. PROPOSAL, REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
ON PREVENTING THE DISSEMINATION OF TERRORIST CONTENT ONLINE, 2018, COM (UK).  
20 COMM. ON THE STANDARDS OF PUB. LIFE, INTIMIDATION IN PUBLIC LIFE, 2017, CM 9543 (UK); 
CABINET OFF. RESPONSE: PROTECTING THE DEBATE: INTIMIDATION, INFLUENCE AND INFORMATION, 
2019 (UK).  
21 HOUSE OF COMMONS DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMM., FINAL REPORT ON 
DISINFORMATION AND “FAKE NEWS”, 2017–19, HC 1791 (UK); HOUSE OF COMMONS DIGITAL, 
CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMM., DISINFORMATION AND “FAKE NEWS”: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
TO THE COMMITTEE’S EIGHTH REPORT, 2017–19, HC 2184 (UK); see also COMM’N COMMUNICATION, 
TACKLING ONLINE DISINFORMATION: A EUROPEAN APPROACH, 2018, COM (UK); COMM’N 
COMMUNICATION, TACKLING ONLINE DISINFORMATION: COMMISSION PROPOSES AN EU-WIDE CODE OF 
PRAC., 2018 (UK). 
22 INFO. COMM’R’S OFF., REPORT TO PARLIAMENT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE USE OF DATA 
ANALYTICS IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS, 2018, (UK); INFO. COMM’R’S OFF., DEMOCRACY DISRUPTED? 
PERSONAL INFORMATION AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE, 2018, (UK). 
23 See Irini Katsirea, “Fake news”: Reconsidering the Value of Untruthful Expression in the Face of 
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reflects economic and national security interests, rather than culture and crime 
protection.24 It superseded The UK Cyber Security Strategy published in 201125 
and reflects the U.K. Government’s broader National Security Strategy 2010, 
which identified as a “Tier 1” threat the “[h]ostile attacks upon UK cyberspace 
by other states and by large scale cybercrime.”26 Later statements also reflect 
that priority.27 According to the European Commission President, Jean Claude 
Juncker, “Cyber-attacks can be more dangerous to the stability of democracies 
and economies than guns and tanks.”28 Therefore, cybercrime reduction has been 
featured as a key priority objective for the European Union ever since the 
European Union’s Cybersecurity Strategy of 2013.29 
The 2016 U.K. cyber strategy is to defend, deter, and develop.30 The most 
tangible initiative was to set up a National Cyber Security Centre that monitors 
and responds to major incidents and provides an interface to state security for 
the civil sector.31 The strategy reflects a determination that “[w]e will treat a 
cyberattack on the UK as seriously as we would an equivalent conventional 
attack and we will defend ourselves as necessary.”32 However, the degree of 
determination has been questioned by the National Audit Office (NAO) in its 
2019 review, Progress of the 2016–2021 National Cyber Security Programme.33 
The NAO praises the establishment of the National Cyber Security Centre and 
accepts its establishment has led to the reduction of risk. However, it is dubious 
about the practicality of some strategic objectives. The House of Commons 
Committee of Public Accounts also expressed doubts about a weak evidence 
base and the lack of a business case.34 These verdicts contrast with the 
government’s own more positive current assessment.35 
With this background and the desire to prevent dreams from being turned 




24 See HM GOV’T, NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY 2016-2021, 2016 (UK). 
25 See CABINET OFF., REPORT ON THE U.K. CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY: PROTECTING AND 
PROMOTING THE U.K. IN A DIGITAL WORLD, 2011 (UK). 
26 HM GOV’T, A STRONG BRITAIN IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY: THE NAT’L SECURITY STRATEGY, 
2010, 25-26 (UK). 
27 See HM GOV’T, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC DEFENCE AND SECURITY REV., 
2015, 40 (UK); HM GOV’T, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC 
DEFENCE AND SECURITY REV. 2015, 2016 (UK); HM GOV’T, NATIONAL SECURITY CAPABILITY REVIEW 
INCLUDING THE SECOND ANNUAL REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC DEFENCE AND SECURITY REVIEW 2015, 2018 (UK). 
28 European Commission Press Release SPEECH/17/3165, President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of 
the Union Address (Sep. 13, 2017). 
29 High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Cybersecurity 
Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, JOIN (July 2, 2013), 
https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf. 
30 NAT’L CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY 2016-2021, supra note 24, at 9.  
31 NAT’L CYBER SECURITY CTR., https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2019). 
32 NAT’L CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY 2016-2021, supra note 24, at 25. 
33 NAT’L AUDIT OFF., REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF THE 2016-2021 NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY 
PROGRAMME, 2019 (UK). 
34 HOUSE OF COMMONS COMM. OF PUB. ACCOUNTS, REPORT ON CYBER SECURITY IN THE U.K., 
2017-2019, HC 1745 (UK). 
35 NAT’L AUDIT OFF., PROGRESS REPORT ON NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY 2016-2021, 
2017-2019, HC 1988 (UK). 
36 See Jeremy Wright, Attorney General, U.K. Attorney General’s Office, Address at Chatham House 
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paper. The first element is whether it is possible conceptually to conceive a 
meaningful domestic law response to a transnational cyberattack. One must ask, 
can law be a valuable instrument to defend, deter, and develop the U.K. against 
cyberattacks? This enterprise will involve ontological inquiries to identify a 
potential harm as both a “cyberattack” and as “transnational.” Aside from these 
ontological debates about the identification of harm, the nature of law as an 
appropriate and capable regulatory instrument in cyberspace will then be 
examined. A further constraint is that a legal response will only be “meaningful” 
if it advances objectives in ways which are efficient and effective, as well as fair.  
The second element of the agenda is whether a meaningful domestic law 
agenda can be comprehensively devised in response to transnational 
cyberattacks. The agenda that can be implemented by law might be both tactical 
and operational. At the tactical level, there may be broad duties which relate to 
resilience and recovery. At the operational level, mechanisms to be tackled 
include police powers, criminal offenses, and sanctions.  
 
 
I. MEANINGFUL DOMESTIC LAW RESPONSE TO TRANSNATIONAL 
CYBERATTACK AS A CONCEPT 
 
 
Is it possible conceptually to design a meaningful domestic law response to 
any transnational cyberattack? Can law be a valuable instrument of the U.K. 
National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021’s objectives to defend, deter, and 
develop the U.K. in cyberspace?37 This enterprise involves identifying potential 
harms as both “cyberattacks” and as “transnational.” Conceptual and definitional 
issues thereby arise. Aside from these ontological debates about harm, the nature 
of law as an appropriate regulatory instrument in cyberspace must then be 
examined. 
 
A. ONTOLOGY OF TRANSNATIONAL CYBERATTACK 
 
In pursuit of the nature of “cyberattack,” Annex 2, Glossary of the National 
Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 advances the following concept, defining a 
cyberattack as “deliberate exploitation of computer systems, digitally-dependent 
enterprises, and networks to cause harm.”38 This formulation is very broad. For 
instance, when the word “harm” is mentioned, we must ask “which harms, by 
whom, and how?” An alternative version might make use of the idea that 
cyberattacks connote the usage of cyberspace as a mechanism to conduct 
“hostile activities.” “Hostile activities” were recently defined in the Counter 





century. See also Michael Schmitt, U.S. Cyber Command, Russia and Critical Infrastructure: What 
Norms and Laws Apply? JUST SECURITY (June 18, 2019) (discussing Cyber and International Security in 
the twenty-first century), https://www.justsecurity.org/64614/u-s-cyber-command-russia-and-critical-
infrastructure-what-norms-and-laws-apply. 
37 NAT’L CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY 2016-2021, supra note 24, at 9. 
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(5) A person is or has been engaged in hostile activity for the 
purposes of this Schedule if the person is or has been concerned 
in the commission, preparation or instigation of a hostile act that 
is or may be— 
(a) carried out for, or on behalf of, a State other than the 
United Kingdom, or 
(b) otherwise in the interests of a State other than the United 
Kingdom. 
(6) An act is a “hostile act” if it— 
(a) threatens national security, 
(b) threatens the economic well-being of the United 
Kingdom in a way relevant to the interests of national 
security, or 
(c) is an act of serious crime. 39 
 
This definition, which is claimed to respond to the attempted poisoning of Sergei 
Skripal in Salisbury in 2018, is still far from precise, but it usefully points 
towards both seriousness in scale and also state involvement. However, this 
formulation may be too narrow to capture all forms of cyberattack. Seriousness 
may be intended rather than actual, while state involvement may be hidden. 
Next, Professor Hathaway, an expert in international law, has defined 
“cyberattack” as “any action taken to undermine the functions of a computer 
network for a political or national security purpose.”40 Consequently, she argues 
that cyberattacks exist as a separate category from cyber warfare and cybercrime 
based on the objective of the attack. Nonetheless, she does not insist on state 
involvement. Reflecting further on these formulations, it is helpful to 
concentrate on the variables suggested by Professor Masood in her research:41 
(1) the identity of the perpetrators, victims, and the targets; (2) the method, scale, 
and impact of the attacks; and (3) the motives of the attacks. These variables 
better conceptualize cyberattacks and begin to indicate the required responses.42 
The first variable in formulating the concept of cyberattacks is the identity 
of the perpetrators. The attacks may be domestic or foreign, and they can be 
attributed to state or non-state actors, including hackers and hacktivists, 
terrorists, criminals, corporations, and insiders. These boundaries can be fluid, 




39 Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, c.3 (UK); see generally Counter-Terrorism and 
Border Security Act 2019: Hostile State Activity Ports Power Fact Sheet, 3, ¶ 1, HOME OFF., (2019) (UK); 
See also Org. for the Prohibition of Chem. Weapons [OPCW], Note by the Technical Secretariat: 
Summary of the Report on Activities Carried Out in Support of a Request for Technical Assistance by the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, TAV/02/18 (Apr. 12, 2018); see also Org. for 
the Prohibition of Chem. Weapons [OPCW], Note by the Technical Secretariat: Summary of the Report 
on Activities Carried Out in Support of a Request for Technical Assistance by the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, S/1671/2018 (Sept. 4. 2018). 
40 Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CAL. L. REV. 817, 821 (2012). 
41 U. Masood, An Analysis of Criminal Liability for Cyber Attacks Under International Law and 
Domestic Law, at 33 (2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Leeds) (on file with author). 
42 Thomas Rid & Peter McBurney, Cyber-Weapons, 157 RUSI J. 6, 6 (2012); Emilio Iasiello, Are 
Cyber Weapons Effective Military Tools?, 7 MIL. & STRATEGIC AFF. 23, 29 (Mar. 2015); Ken Barker, 
Cyberattack: What Goes Around, Comes Around, 12:17 U. CALGARY SCH. PUB. POL’Y PUBLICATIONS 
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its Project Raven.43 Problems of attribution often arise.44 The victims or targets 
of cyberattacks may include specific individuals and public or private 
organizations. 
The second variable in determining the concept of cyberattacks is the 
method, scale, and impact of the attacks. Cyberattacks may be committed 
outside the situation of armed conflict, but an element of seriousness in impact 
is a recurrent and insistent theme. The Tallinn Manual defines cyber operations 
as the employment of cyber capabilities with the primary purpose of achieving 
objectives “in or by the use of cyberspace.”45 The Government Communications 
Headquarters of the U.K. (GCHQ) has released the guideline, “Common Cyber 
Attacks: Reducing the Impact” to organizations that are vulnerable to 
cyberattacks. According to the guideline, cyberattacks can be mounted using 
techniques such as: phishing, water holing, ransomware, scanning, spear 
phishing, deploying botnet, and subverting the supply chain.46 Thus, it seems 
that the harmfulness of cyberattacks on computer systems and servers fluctuates.  
The third variable involves an attack’s motives. A cyberattack is 
premeditated, as it requires extensive planning and technical expertise. In 
Professor Taylor’s study of hackers, he found hacking for monetary gain is just 
one motive. Other reasons include boredom, lack of mental stimulation, peer 
recognition, relentless pursuit of power, curiosity, desire to escape from the 
restraints of the real world, and jacking (that is, to see if it could be done).47 
Furthermore, cyberattacks may be committed for public causes. During 
situations of armed conflict, such attacks are undertaken as part of offensive and 
defensive military strategy. Apart from states, non-state actors may conduct 
cyberattacks to further their political, racial, and religious ideologies. 
Cultural and national security priorities also affect the concept of a 
cyberattack. For instance, in Malaysia, the term “national security” usually 
connotes “public order, racial and religious harmony, economic strength, social 
welfare, political stability, and stable government.”48 Most of the participants in 
a study conducted by Professor Masood in Malaysia categorized seditious and 
defamatory statements as cyberattacks.49 These participants thought that the 




43 Christopher Bing & Joel Schectman, Project Raven, Inside the UAE’s Secret Hacking Team of 
American Mercenaries, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-
report/usa-spying-raven/. 
44 See Randall R. Dipert, The Ethics of Cyberwarfare, 9:4 J. MIL. ETHICS 384, 385 (2010); Thomas 
Rid & Ben Buchanan, Attributing Cyber Attacks, 38:1-2 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 4 (2015); Kai Ambos, 
Individual Criminal Responsibility for Cyber Aggression’, 21:3 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 495 (2016); 
Elies van Sliedregt, Command Responsibility and Cyberattacks, 21:3 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 505, 
506 (2016); William C. Banks, The Bumpy Road to a Meaningful International Law of Cyber Attribution, 
113 AJIL UNBOUND 191 (2019); Berenice Boutin, Shared Responsibility for Cyber Operations, 113 AJIL 
UNBOUND 197 (2019); Lorraine Finlay & Christian Payne, The Attribution Problem and Cyber Armed 
Attacks 113 AJIL UNBOUND 202 (2019). 
45 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE, 258 (Michael 
N. Schmitt ed., 1st ed. 2013).  
46 CESG & CERT-UK, COMMON CYBER ATTACKS: REDUCING THE IMPACT, 2016 (UK). 
47 PAUL A. TAYLOR, HACKERS: CRIME IN THE DIGITAL SUBLIME 46 (Routledge ed., 1999). 
48 Sani M. Azizuddin, Balancing Freedom of Speech and National Security in Malaysia, 5 ASIAN 
POL’Y & POL. 585, 586 (2013). 
49 U. Massood, An Analysis of Criminal Liability for Cyber Attacks Under International Law and 
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computer systems caused by malicious software.50 Thus, the perception of 
cyberattacks may vary at the national level, which entails different priorities and 
countermeasures.  
Based on the above variables, Professor Masood classified cyberattacks in 
four categories of cyber wrongdoing: (1) cyber warfare, use of force, unlawful 
intervention under international law; (2) cybercrimes; (3) cyber espionage; and 
(4) cyber terrorism.51 These categories share similarities in terms of their 
methods, impact, and their targets or victims. However, the identity of the 
perpetrators and motives of the attacks are different for each category. 
This discussion leaves many variables in play, and these are reflected in the 
Online Harms document, mentioned above, which also relies on indicative 
behaviors to explain harms. Importantly, that document recognizes that some 
types of harm are inherently too broad for a legal response (such as 
“extremism”). In this way, it remains challenging to differentiate what can be 
called an “attack” demanding enhanced legal responses, what is “misuse,” or 
what is simply unwelcome behavior, beyond existing law.  
It is also difficult to identify the element of “transnationality.” In a sense, 
the operation of the network of networks that comprises the Internet is always 
transnational. The isolation of a culpable element of transnationality may 
encounter major difficulties of proof, as was the case with alleged transnational 
attacks in Estonia,52 Georgia,53 and Ukraine.54 
The conclusion is that reliance on the term “cyberattack” produces 
ontological uncertainties which are especially acute for law, given its claims to 
embody rule of law values of clarity and accountability. In this way, it may be 
possible to give a conceptual description of “cyberattacks,” but still impossible 
to put that concept into a sufficiently legalistic formulation. The cited policy 
papers, including the 23 listed Online Harms, likewise accept that various 
misdeeds in the cyber world can be illustrated and conceptualized. However, the 
inability to create precise definitions suggests that laws should be aimed more at 
the policy-oriented tactical level (resilience and recovery), rather than the 
operational level (powers and liabilities), which directly impinges on individual 
rights.  
 
B. LAW AS AN APPROPRIATE REGULATORY INSTRUMENT IN CYBERSPACE 
 
Aside from the troublesome definition of “cyberattack,” cyberspace 
attributes of transnationality, instantaneity, and accessibility make national or 
transnational levels of legal regulation troublesome to devise or enforce. This 
point has been highlighted by the works of Professor Lessig, who argues that 
computer coding, as the ultimate architect of cyberspace, rather than traditional 
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cyberspace.55 This analysis is criticized by some authors. Computer coding’s 
regulatory success may not be markedly better than sovereign legislation 
because of the open texture of coding.56 Furthermore, regulation by private 
sector coding is damaging to constitutionalism in that the algorithms and codes 
of conduct are not democratically considered nor always published.57  
Yet, the evidence of the policy papers, whether Online Harms or the 
National Cyber Security Strategy statements, points heavily towards 
heterarchical arrangements, public-private cooperation, and reliance on non-
state actors. As stated in the National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 
document: “The Government alone cannot provide for all aspects of the nation’s 
cyber security. An embedded and sustainable approach is needed where citizens, 
industry and other partners in society and government, play their full part in 
securing our networks, services and data . . . .”58 
Four provisos apply to the doubts cast on traditional style legislation in the 
realm of cyberspace. First, the masters of cyberspace have become much more 
receptive in recent years to state regulation. The philosophy of John Perry 
Barlow is ebbing away. Instead, the big technology companies have assumed 
the mantle of established big businesses with corporate mentalities; they are no 
longer a fringe movement for libertarian nerds. Tellingly, Mark Zuckerberg, co-
founder of Facebook, stated in 2019, “We need a more active role for 
governments and regulators.”59 This cultural transformation is reflected in levels 
of cooperation regarding the takedown of materials. For instance, the Counter 
Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU) was launched by the U.K.’s 
Association of Chief Police Officers in 2010,60 to encourage “a civic challenge 
against material that [the public] find offensive, even if it is not illegal.”61 By 
2012, it had received 2,025 alerts, and 10 percent of impugned webpages were 
removed on grounds of illegality.62 By 2018, 304,000 takedowns had been 
arranged without resort to any legislation.63  
Second, politicians have also become emboldened to take on the Internet 
giants after witnessing instances of their transgressive behavior, such as by 
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statements already covered. It is also patent in the recent Christchurch Call,64 
following the attacks on New Zealand mosques by Brenton Tarrant in March 
2019, which have been seized upon as an opportunity to propagate worldwide 
the regulatory blueprints being espoused in the U.K. and the EU (but not in the 
U.S., which declined to attend the meeting or endorse its edicts).65 Whether the 
Christchurch killings were a cyberattack is itself debatable—the attack was 
kinetic and not cyber in nature, though some of the mobilization and planning 
did involve Internet communications, as well as the live streaming of parts of 
the events. 
Third, governments have become emboldened to discuss cyberattacks and 
even their offensive cyber capability.66 Thus, unlike the coyness overlaying the 
Stuxnet attack on Iran in 2010,67 the U.S. announced that it had carried out a 
cyberattack on Iranian tracking systems in 2019 following the downing of a 
drone in the Persian Gulf.68 More generally, U.S. Cyber Command has published 
its aggressive strategy—constant engagement and seizing the initiative—for the 
whole world to apprehend.69 This public admission of capabilities and actions 
will make legal regulation much more feasible. 
Fourth, cyberspace facilitators are not entirely to be trusted to look after 
themselves or the public. For instance, a recent statement by the Bank of England 
pointed to the dangers of leaving to the private sector responses to state 
sponsored cyberattacks. The regulator feared that the banks will restore 
corrupted systems in order to reduce the reputational costs of outages which they 
commercially prioritize over standards of security.70 Consequently, 
governments must retain a public-interest-oriented role in regulating Internet 
intermediaries within national borders.71  
In conclusion, it is possible to conceptualize the value of an effective and 
fair intervention by domestic law in response to a cyberattack. Such laws could 
have meaning and support. But the environment of the Internet does entail limits 
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seem to take shape in a multilateral context where symbolism can mask the lack 
of more concrete action. 
Before moving on to the possible legal counter cyberattack catalogue, a note 
of caution should be entered by considering important side constraints. “Don’t 
be evil,” the motto once used in Google’s corporate code of conduct, or the more 
expansive Alphabet maxim of “do the right thing,” (as of 2015)72 is a valuable 
reminder that fairness and individual rights must be respected or even deepened 
along the way. Thus, a legal response can only be legitimate if it advances 
objectives in ways which are fair as well as efficient and effective. Fairness will 
give rise to considerations relating to the protection of free expression and due 
process. These values are difficult to enforce against the private actors in control 
of Internet infrastructure, especially if profits seem more important to them than 
political freedoms. The Online Harms document uses this demand as an 
argument for public regulation, by viewing the state as more trustworthy than 
the private sector. 
 
 
III. MEANINGFUL DOMESTIC LAW RESPONSES TO TRANSNATIONAL 
CYBERATTACK AS AN AGENDA  
 
 
The second part of this paper considers the contents of a meaningful 
domestic law agenda in response to a transnational cyberattack. The potential 
domestic legal agenda could be both tactical and operational. At the tactical 
level, there are broad legal duties which relate to resilience and recovery. At the 
operational level, themes include: police powers, criminal offenses, and civil 
sanctions.  
 
A. TACTICAL INTERVENTIONS 
 
The agenda to be addressed here involves the broad tasks of resilience and 
recovery. In the U.K., such notions are the subject of the Civil Contingencies 
Act 2004, Part I. Those “responders” who are covered by the legislation include 
many government and public agencies and also “person[s] who provide a public 
electronic communications network which makes telephone services available 
(whether for spoken communication or for the transmission of data).”73 This 
definition of “responders” does not include most CSP providers but is limited to 
enterprises providing network structures. These responders bear broad planning 
and investment duties established by law. This work is overseen by the Cabinet 
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Emergencies, the Cabinet Office lists cyberattacks as one of the important risks 
to be addressed.75 
In addition to the sectors covered by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, the 
U.K. government employs the concept “Critical National Infrastructure” (CNI), 
of which “communications” forms one of 13 sectors.76 Resilience planning for 
that sector includes the edict, “Telecoms & Internet; Broadcast: To work with 
industry to assess the risk posed to the sector by cyber-attack and prolonged 
power loss.”77 This work is aided by the Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure,78 which provides advice and assistance to those who have 
responsibility for protecting relevant assets, most of which are held in private 
ownership. This private ownership can create barriers to information transfer 
and trust.79 The resilience planning mainly takes the form of collaborative and 
non-legislative corporatist style engagement, a mode which also applies to work 
beyond the CNI.80  
Another area in which legislation has intervened is exemplified by Directive 
(EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council, which concerns 
measures for a high common level of security for networks and information 
systems across the Union.81 This Directive became U.K. law under the Network 
and Information Systems Regulations 2018.82 The Directive places requirements 
on bodies providing essential services in CNI sectors so as to ensure security and 
resilience of networks and IT systems. Regulation 3(2) designates the 
Information Commissioner as the national competent authority for relevant 
digital service providers (RDSPs). Regulation 4 designates a “single point of 
contact” (SPOC) for the U.K., and regulation 5 designates the U.K.’s computer 
security incident response team (which is CERT-U.K.), as required by the 
Directive.83 The computer security incident response team should respond to 
cybersecurity incidents, engage in a coordination network for the purposes of 
information sharing, ensure that essential services and suppliers have 




75 CABINET OFFICE, MINISTRY OF GOV’T RESILIENCE AND EFFICIENCY, NATIONAL RISK REGISTER 
FOR CIVIL EMERGENCIES 2017 EDITION, 2017, 63 (UK); see also NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY CTR., 
INDIVIDUALS AND FAMILIES, https://www.cyberaware. gov.uk/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2019). 
76 See Clive Walker, The Governance of the Critical National Infrastructure, Pub. L. 323 (2008).  
77 CABINET OFFICE, PUBLIC SUMMARY OF SECTOR SECURITY AND RESILIENCE PLANS, 2019, 12 
(UK). 
78 CTR. FOR PROTECTION OF NAT’L INFRASTRUCTURE, https://www.cpni.gov.uk/ (last visited Sept. 
24, 2019). 
79 Christopher H. Bovis, Risk in Public-Private Partnerships and Critical Infrastructure, 6 EUR. J. OF 
RISK REG. 200 (2015). 
80 See Financial Stability Board Cyber Incident Response and Recovery: Survey of Industry Practices 
(2019), https://www.fsb.org/2019/07/cyber-incident-response-and-recovery-survey-of-industry-
practices. 
81 European Parliament and Council Directive (EU) 2016/1148 Concerning Measures for a High 
Common Level of Security of Network and Information Systems Across The Union, 2016 O.J. (L. 191) 1 
(July 6, 2016). See also Daniel Fiott & Roderick Parkes, The EU’s Response to Hybrid Threats, EUR. 
UNION INST. FOR SECURITY STUD., at 29 (Apr. 2019).  
82 The Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018, SI 2018/506 (UK). See also DEP’T FOR 
DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT, GUIDANCE FOR COMPETENT AUTHORITIES ON SECURITY OF 
NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2018 (UK). 
83 Cabinet Office Press Release, U.K. Launches First National CERT (Mar. 31, 2014), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-launches-first-national-cert. Launched in 2014, this body is 







68 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. vol. 10:1 
 
 
to national authorities. Part 3 allows for the designation of operators of essential 
services (OES). Each OES must fulfil the security duties set out in regulation 10 
and the duty to notify incidents set out in regulation 11. Part 4 of the Regulations 
sets out the duties which apply to RDSPs and the Information Commissioner, 
including a duty on all RDSPs to register with the Information Commissioner. 
Part 5 makes provision for powers of enforcement and penalties which apply to 
contraventions of the duties. A threshold for applicability to the digital 
infrastructure subsector applies under Schedule 2 paragraph 10, so that the 
Regulations are applicable only to Top Level Domain (TLD) Name Registries, 
Domain Name System (DNS) Service Providers, and Internet Exchange Point 
(IXP) Operators. Thus, even under the NIS Directive, there is very limited 
applicability to the Internet sector.  
In the U.S., it was more difficult to secure comprehensive legislation on 
resilience planning,84 but some progress was made through Executive Order 
13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, and Presidential Policy 
Directive-21, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. This Executive 
Order seeks to develop a cybersecurity framework by promoting and 
incentivizing the adoption of cybersecurity standards and practices through the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology and by encouraging cyber threat 
information sharing.85 The Presidential Policy Directive-21 directs government 
officials to address cyber working vulnerabilities and failures, to advance public-
private partnerships, and to update the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.86 
However, after subsequent security breaches and cyberattacks, Executive Order 
13691 was added to encourage and promote sharing of cybersecurity threat 
information within the private sector and between the public and private sectors. 
After this, Congress passed the Cybersecurity Act of 2015,87 which builds on the 
existing initiatives and establishes legal platforms for cybersecurity information 
sharing between private sector and federal government entities (with the 
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center in the 
Department for Homeland Security as the gateway) and for the monitoring of 
information systems and defensive measures (such as blocking but not 
destruction or hacking the facilities of the intruders, which would be offensive 
measures). It also implements a range of measures intended to improve the 
cybersecurity preparedness of critical information systems and networks. Even 
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More general regulatory duties might in the future be imposed by the 
regulatory intervention under the U.K. national proposals in the Online Harms 
paper. Under this document:88 
 
The government will establish a new statutory duty of care to 
make companies take more responsibility for the safety of their 
users and tackle harm caused by content or activity on their 
services. Compliance with this duty of care will be overseen and 
enforced by an independent regulator.89 
 
The proposed statutory duty of care will require companies to take reasonable 
steps to keep users safe and prevent third parties from being harmed as a direct 
consequence using their services. The fulfilment of this duty will be overseen 
and enforced by an independent regulator. A civil action at the behest of the 
victim is not envisaged. Less direct enforcement might involve the invocation 
of some variant of the Digital Economy Act 2017, section 103, which allows for 
a code of practice for providers of online social media platforms to be issued by 
the Secretary of State where conduct online is directed at an individual, and 
involves bullying or insulting the individual, or other behavior likely to 
intimidate or humiliate the individual. However, “cyberattack” is not one of the 
twenty-three listed harms and the term appears only once (in connection with 
products rather than usage or content).90 So, it would require further extension 
of an already controversially wide duty to demand protective action by 
regulation against transnational cyberattack.  
 
B. OPERATIONAL INTERVENTIONS 
 
1. Police Powers 
 
A full upgrade of policing powers to investigate harms which make use of 
telephonic communications, Internet and data collections, has recently been 
undertaken in the U.K. via the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.  
Following review,91 the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IP Act 2016) has 
radically overhauled electronic surveillance but left untouched other relevant 
aspects of the Police Act 1997 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
2000.92 The IP Act 2016 regulates the interception of communications (Part 2, 
chapter 1), acquisition and retention of communications data (Part 3, chapter 2 
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personal datasets (Part 7). These are all subject to Part 1, whereby the IP Act 
2016 loftily sets out “General Privacy Protections.” These impose four 
mandatory tests on the person authorizing the intervention: first, whether the 
objective could reasonably be achieved through less intrusive means; second, 
whether a higher level of protection is applied to sensitive information; third, 
whether there is due regard to the public interest in protecting the “integrity and 
security” of communications; fourth, whether “any other public interest in the 
protection of privacy”93 is considered. In general, authorizations to engage in 
surveillance within the IP Act 2016 are subject to approval by Judicial 
Commissioners who, under section 23, “apply the same principles as would be 
applied by a court on an application for judicial review’.”94 In practice, the 
Investigatory Powers Commissioner Office has indicated an enhanced standard 
of review.95 Yet, whereas the arrangement is described as a “double lock” 
(alongside the government minister who initiates the action), it is not an “equal 
lock” in terms of allowing a de novo inquiry.96  
Three types of interception warrants replace the former single warrant 
regime: targeted interception, examination, and mutual assistance warrants (Part 
2). The grounds upon which warrants can be granted are for: national security, 
preventing or detecting serious crime, or in the interests of the economic well-
being of the United Kingdom. The latter two grounds will be accepted so far as 
they are also relevant to the interests of national security. Before granting initial 
authorization, the Secretary of State must deem the warrant necessary, that the 
conduct is proportionate to its objectives, and that satisfactory safeguards have 
been arranged. Other than in urgent cases, before execution, the warrant must 
then be approved by a judicial commissioner. Enhanced safeguards apply to 
parliamentarians, legally privileged communications, and journalistic material 
and sources.  
Parts 3 and 4 of the IP Act 2016, dealing with the acquisition and retention 
of communications data (the “who,” “when,” and “where” of a communication, 
but not its content) remain subject to attack by litigation. Indeed, the extensive 
grounds upon which an authorization can be granted have been held unlawful 
by domestic courts,97 and the government has already conceded the need to 
amend the IP Act 2016 version of retention powers.98 The government has also 
set up an Office for Communications Data Authorisations (OCDA) under the 
Investigatory Powers Commissioner, to review requests for communications 
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providers.99 This development was in response to criticisms by the European 
Court of Justice in Joined Cases Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-och telestyrelsen and 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Watson.100 
Equipment interference, under Part 5, also known as computer network 
exploitation (CNE), has only been publicly affirmed by the U.K. government 
since early 2015,101 an “avowal,” as it has become known, which responded to 
adverse litigation.102 Prior to the IP Act 2016, equipment interference was 
vaguely alluded to in sections 5 and 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994. 
These two sections have been replaced with 37 sections in the IP Act 2016, Part 
5, and a Code of Practice that runs to 147 pages.103 Applications for warrants 
follow the same scheme as interception warrants: there are targeted warrants and 
targeted examination warrants. It is open to the intelligence services, law 
enforcement, and defense intelligence to apply for a warrant, which requires 
judicial approval.  
Bulk warrants104 are available in respect to each of the substantive resources 
under the IP Act 2016, Part 6, so interception, acquisition of communications 
data, and equipment interference are all potentially covered, as well as bulk 
personal datasets in Part 7. The relevant Code of Practice describes “Bulk 
Personal Datasets” as including “personal data relating to a number of 
individuals, and the nature of that set is such that the majority of individuals 
contained within it are not, and are unlikely to become, of interest to the 
intelligence agencies in the exercise of their statutory functions.”105 Only the 
security agencies may invoke bulk collection powers. The bulk interception and 
equipment interference warrants are to serve overseas intelligence gathering 
purposes,106 but bulk acquisition of communications data can be internal. The 
application process broadly mirrors the scheme in respect to each discrete 
resource. Extra safeguards exist for parliamentarians, legal professional 
privilege, and journalistic materials or sources.  
It seems hardly desirable now to go further—for the sake of more specific 
protection against cyberattacks—so soon after such major extensions of the law. 
One possibility, already raised, would be to build on the precedent of the concept 
of “hostile activity” in the Counter Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, 
schedule 3, to allow for suspicionless (and warrantless) inquiries regarding the 
borderless Internet. However, the counterargument would be that hostile activity 
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powers on the same basis as investigating cyberattacks potentially committed by 
anyone within the jurisdiction, would undermine the regulated scheme of the IP 
Act 2016. Also, this would create endless possibilities of general searches. The 
damage to fairness by intrusion upon privacy rights is evident. Perhaps, the only 
exception might be a power of compulsory repair, if a hardware or software 





Criminal law has the potential to serve several functions mitigating 
cyberattacks. Firstly, criminal law may be a better option than civil law in 
dealing with online wrongdoings, as it seeks to punish and deter aberrant 
conduct in the interests of the public rather than a self-selected litigant.108 Civil 
law may not place sufficient restrictions on the perpetrator’s liberty to prevent 
future attacks or to reassure victims or the wider community. Apart from 
deterrence, criminal law can allow for early intervention through the 
criminalization of preparatory acts which protect citizens from future harm.109 
In addition, criminal law may be utilized to impose the duty on the public “to 
help themselves and the state.”110 Just as the employees of the financial sectors 
are obliged to report their suspicion of terrorist financing to a central authority, 
so too may criminal law be used to persuade the public to report the occurrence 
of cyberattacks. Next, criminal law encourages solidarity in managing 
cyberattacks.111 Thus, the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime was 
formulated in order to overcome the inconsistencies of cybercrime legislation 
among states112 and seeks to foster cooperation among states to suppress 
cybercrime. It has been backed by the EU Cybercrime Directive, which requires 
national adoption of corresponding legislative measures.113 However, the 
effectiveness of the Cybercrime Convention depends on the willingness of the 
state parties to cooperate. Any attempts to pursue cybercriminals in other 
jurisdictions must be made in tandem with the local enforcement authorities. 
Accordingly, the cost of criminal enforcement may be high. However, mutual 
legal assistance concerning cybercrime “offers a means of controlling harmful 
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wider community.”114 Cyberattacks can even harm national security objectives 
“to protect our people; to project our global influence; and to promote our 
prosperity.”115 
Cybercrimes can be divided into three groups: (1) computer integrity 
crimes; (2) computer related crimes; and (3) computer content crimes.116 Outside 
of the purview of war crimes, the application of international crimes under the 
Rome Statute for cyberattacks seems somewhat distant,117 so the main focus 
should be on domestic law. For the U.K., these crimes are largely set out in the 
Computer Misuse Act 1990.118 Of particular relevance to cyberattacks is section 
3ZA, dealing with “[u]nauthorised acts causing, or creating risk of, serious 
damage.”119 The offense is in line with the EU Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks 
against information systems, which emphasizes the need to ensure protection of 
the critical national infrastructure against cyberattacks, including the imposition 
of heavier criminal sanctions.120 So, section 3ZA deals with the most serious 
cyberattacks and provides heavier sentencing to reflect the gravity of these 
offenses. The amendment was made in 2015, and it also confers the courts with 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and extends the scope of section 3A of the Computer 
Misuse Act 1990 to cover articles for personal use.121 Under section 3ZA, a 
person is guilty of an offense (punishable by up to 14 years of imprisonment or 
life where there is serious damage to human welfare or to national security) if: 
 
(1) . . . 
(a) the person does any unauthorized act in relation to a 
computer; 
(b) at the time of doing the act the person knows that it is 
unauthorized; 
(c) the act causes, or creates a significant risk of, serious 
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(d) the person intends by doing the act to cause serious 
damage of a material kind or is reckless as to whether such 
damage is caused. 
(2) Damage is of a “material kind” for the purposes of this 
section if it is— 
(a) damage to human welfare in any place; 
(b) damage to the environment of any place; 
(c) damage to the economy of any country; or 
(d) damage to the national security of any country. 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a) an act causes damage 
to human welfare only if it causes— 
(a) loss to human life; 
(b) human illness or injury; 
(c) disruption of a supply of money, food, water, energy or 
fuel; 
(d) disruption of a system of communication; 
(e) disruption of facilities for transport; or 
(f) disruption of services relating to health. 
 
Accordingly, the notion of harm for cyberattacks is broader than existing 
criminal misuse offenses due to the potential forms of damage caused by the 
attacks, which may go well beyond impacts on data or computers. However, 
questions arise about these more exotic forms of harm.122 How does the court 
determine the threat or harm to human welfare, economy and the national 
security?123 Breadth is also a feature of the two part mens rea under section 3ZA. 
First, the accused must know that he is committing an unauthorized act in 
relation to a computer. Second, he must intend to cause the harm or act recklessly 
as to whether such damage is caused.124 With regard to the second part, the 
intention of the accused may be inferred from: the nature of the cyber weapon 
used; the place where the damage was inflicted; the nature of the damages 
caused; and the opportunity for commission. Cyberattacks are usually 
premeditated, since they require extensive planning and technical expertise. 
Nonetheless, these attacks may be committed recklessly, as when the accused 
does not foresee that the cyberattack is likely to cause the damage of a kind 
required under 3ZA, but there was sufficient evidence of its probability. 
In addition to section 3ZA, preparatory offenses should also be given 
consideration. Pursuant to Directive 2013/40/EU, the Serious Crime Act 2015, 
section 41 (replacing an earlier version in the Police and Justice Act 2006, 
section 37) inserted another offense into the Computer Misuse Act 1990 as 
section 3A, which makes it an offense for anyone who makes, adapts, supplies 
or offers to supply any article intending it to be used to commit, or to assist in 
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the police to intervene before the occurrence of an attack, when the offender has 
procured the malware for their personal use.125 The Act also empowers U.K. law 
enforcement agencies to initiate action against U.K. citizens who commit 
cybercrimes whilst physically outside of the U.K. on the basis of their 
nationality.126  
In light of this legislative initiative, gaps in criminal law are not evident. 
Instead, attention should be turned towards enforcement measures against 
cyberattack. These might include a duty to report incidents to the Cyber 
Emergency Response Team (CERT-UK).127 The reluctance of individuals and 
private institutions to report the occurrence of cybercrime to the police hampers 
the enforcement of the law.128 Their hesitation might arise because commitment 
is to their own interests (including those of shareholders) which may prioritize 
the stability of the market and public confidence. First, the financial institutions 
do not want the public to know that their computer systems are vulnerable to any 
attacks, even if reduction of that vulnerability would be for the common good. 
Second, they may calculate that the cost of implementing security measures 
exceeds the losses. Third, private owners may perceive that the duty to protect 
national infrastructure is the responsibility of the state. Fourth, the imposition of 
regulations will impair their ability to innovate. The European Commission has 
proposed that member states should oblige operators of critical infrastructures 
and public administrations to report serious incidents to national authorities.129 
However, that proposal has been rejected by multiple states, including Sweden, 
Ireland and the U.K.130 Both states and private financial institutions are reluctant 
to share the information due to security reasons. Thus, the duty to report cyber 
incidents may be difficult to implement. A more palatable reform might be to 
strengthen the expertise of law enforcement officers dealing with 
cyberattacks.131 Yet, the imposition of compulsory formal competencies for such 
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3. Civil Law Measures 
 
Non-criminal measures, including preventative strategies and civil action, 
may be used to counter cyberattacks.133 Protective security measures are vital to 
protect societal interests, rather than concentrating on the individual offender 
and victim. Protective security measures against cyberattacks might be based on 
a variety of approaches. The most indirect approach would be the improvement 
of social conditions by creating employment and educational opportunities. For 
instance, Brenner and Clarke suggested incentivizing civilians to prevent 
cybercrime.134  
More directly, protective security could impede the occurrence of crime. 
Target hardening is especially important, as cyberattacks are often premeditated. 
Besides making dangerous technical devices more difficult to obtain (as per the 
Computer Misuse Act 1990, section 3A), other tactics may be used. They 
include: installing antivirus software and encryption; encouraging compliance 
with good technical standards such as ISO/IEC 27001 for information security 
management;135 ensuring that IT appliances and computer systems are 
constantly updated and improved; controlling access to usernames and web 
equipment; and restricting the usage of electronic devices.  
A more ambitious scheme of regulatory target-hardening has been adopted 
by the European Union. By Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union 
Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology 
cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 
(Cybersecurity Act), ENISA has been reformulated as the EU Agency for 
Cybersecurity. This agency will take the lead in maintaining the European 
Cybersecurity Certification framework by which multiple schemes will be 
created for different categories of ICT products, processes, and services. Each 
scheme will specify, inter alia, the type of ICT products, services, and processes 
covered, the purpose, security standards, and evaluation methods. Using a 
European Cybersecurity Certificate, a private sector company will be able to 
demonstrate the security of its products. Though certification is voluntary for 
four years, it may not remain so thereafter, given the EU’s ambitions as a 
globally influential cybersecurity norm-setter.136 Various concerns have been 
raised with respect to this approach, including the practical ability to centralize 
under one relatively small public authority, the proficiency of the vast and ever-
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information about vulnerabilities (some of which may be national security 
secrets),137 and the costs of an effective scheme. 
Apart from protective security measures, states are using technological 
measures, such as Blockchain, in dealing with cyberattacks. For instance, 
Estonia uses keyless signature infrastructure in which electronic activity is 
verified mathematically on the Blockchain without the intervention of a system 
administrator or government staff.138 While centralized authorities and services 
are vulnerable to cyberattacks as they amass and manage troves of data, 
Blockchain distributes and shares the data in immutable database ledgers across 
a peer-to-peer network.139 Public and private institutions no longer own and 
control data as the Blockchain technology breaks the centralization of the 
Internet. Blockchain ensures the confidentiality and authenticity of the data as it 
uses Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to establish a highly secure platform.140 
However, the implementation of Blockchain technology is challenging, as not 
many potential users understand its applications and implications. Furthermore, 
Blockchain faces hurdles such as capacity problems, system failures, and 
technically inexperienced users.141 Thus, Blockchain may not be an immediate 
solution to the phenomenon of cyberattacks, but it has promising potential for 
providing long-lasting answers to this problem. 
In addition to general prevention through regulation, civil law can also be 
applied as a form of reaction to actual or anticipated cyberattacks. First, victims 
may initiate a civil action for ‘economic’ or ‘intentional’ torts against the 
perpetrators of cyberattacks.142 Negligence actions might also be considered.143 
Besides damages, other remedies could include injunctions and restraining 
orders. In 2010, a federal judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia granted Microsoft’s request for a temporary restraining order 
against almost three-hundred Internet Domains.144 A group of criminals known 
as Waledac used these domains to facilitate and continuously control the ability 
of the computers to communicate with each other as Botnets.  
A civil remedy, such as an injunction, also may be invoked to respond to 
cyberattacks in the U.K. The Protection from Harassment Act 1997, section 3A, 
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amounts to harassment.145 The victims of cyberattacks may use this remedy to 
stop perpetrators from making their lives intolerable through constant computer 
system intrusions. In the case of Huntingdon Life Sciences Group v. Stop 
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty, the claimant initiated an action against the 
respondent for conducting an unlawful campaign to promote its closure. The 
claimant contended that the respondent organization had the aim of making life 
intolerable for its employees. An interim injunction was granted on the balance 
of convenience, when the claimants demonstrated a good arguable claim and 
serious questions to be tried.146 In Astrazeneca U.K. Ltd. v. Vincent, an interim 
injunction was granted to Astrazeneca U.K. Ltd., a pharmaceutical company 
related to Huntingdon Life Sciences.147 When states are involved in 
cyberattacks, injunctions may be less applicable because of state immunity.148  
For corresponding state-oriented wrongdoing, the application of economic 
sanctions might be considered. This idea was applied to cyberattacks by the U.S. 
government under Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015: Blocking the 
Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled 
Activities. This was followed by Executive Order 13757 of December 28, 2016: 
Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency with Respect to 
Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities. This instrument was passed as 
a declared national emergency under the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act to combat cyberattacks continually launched at the U.S., initially 
with a view to Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential elections, 
though the orders are set on a permanent basis.149 To date, there has been modest 
invocation. The targets are the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (the 
Glavnoe Razvedyvatel’noe Upravlenie or GRU) and the Federal Security 
Service (Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti or FSB), plus four individual 
intelligence heads. Some have also called for these organizations to be 
designated as terrorist groups under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996.150 One attendant difficulty is to identify a labeled entity as 
state-based as opposed to collectives of likeminded sympathizers.151 There also 
arise dangers from sanctioning state organizations as terrorists; for instance, the 
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armed forces, raised potential problems in humanitarian law and the danger of 
reprisals.152 
Because of concerns about the increased ability and willingness of state and 
non-state actors to pursue their objectives by undertaking malicious cyber 
activities, the Council of the EU adopted conclusions on June 19, 2017 on a 
framework for a joint diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities (‘the 
Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox’).153 Council Regulation (EU) 2019/796 of May 17, 
2019, concerning restrictive measures against cyberattacks threatening the 
Union or its Member States, was later passed.154 The measures include the 
freezing of funds and economic resources of any persons and entities listed in 
Annex I, to the Council Regulation and ensuring that funds and economic 
resources are not made available to them or for their benefit. To fall within the 
scope of this regime, the cyberattacks must have significant impact, and 
originate from, use infrastructure or be carried out by persons operating outside 
the EU. For the U.K., implementation has been undertaken by the Cyber-Attacks 
(Asset-Freezing) Regulations 2019.155  
The use of sanctions in this way faces obstacles. Some cyberattacks may 
originate outside the EU. Even against identified assailants, the impact is 
uncertain. One might compare, first, the alleged attackers of Litvinenko—by the 
Andrey Lugovoy and Dmitri Kovtun Freezing Order 2016,156 made under 
sections 4 and 14 and Schedule 3 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001. The Order has two notable features. One is that Vladimir Putin is not on 
the list, even though he was named by Sir Robert Owen in the Litvinenko Inquiry 
report as probably responsible.157 The second is that the use of the 2001 Act 
takes the basis beyond terrorism—section 4 is invoked on the basis that “action 
constituting a threat to the life or property of one or more nationals of the United 
Kingdom or residents of the United Kingdom has been or is likely to be taken 
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A second problematic use of sanctions concerns the alleged Salisbury 
attacks in March 2018, on Sergei Skripal, his daughter Yulia, and police 
investigator Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey.159 Charlie Rowley and Dawn 
Sturgess also came into contact with the Novichok poison, and Sturgess was 
killed.160 Russian state agents were blamed by the Prime Minister.161 The 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) later confirmed 
the accusations of the United Kingdom government relating to the identity of the 
toxic chemical that was used in Salisbury.162 Subsequently, the Crown 
Prosecution Service, announced charges against two Russian officials: 
Alexander Petrov and Ruslan Boshirov.163 The charges included counts under 
the Chemical Weapons Act 1996, but did not include any mention of terrorism 
or the murder of Dawn Sturgess. The latter was confirmed by the OPCW to be 
related to the same Novichok agent as in the Skripal cases.164 Denials from the 
suspects and Russian government have also been aired. One response to these 
episodes was a new scheme of economic sanctions. The European Union 
sanctions, issued under what became Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1542,165 
were implemented in the U.K. by the Chemical Weapons (Asset-Freezing) and 
Miscellaneous Amendments Regulations 2018.166 Diplomatic expulsions were 
also implemented (twenty-three from the U.K. and others from more than twenty 
other countries),167 but neither the expulsions nor the sanctions have produced 
any discernible progress toward criminal process, civil remedies, or diplomatic 
cooperation.168 
To conclude, sanctions in response to a cyberattack do not seem to be a 
promising counterpart to financial sanctions for financial misconduct. The 
perpetrator is not easily identifiable in the first place since ‘know your customer’ 
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21/01/2019: Chepiga, Anatoliy Vladimirovich; Mishkin, Alexander Yevgeniyevich; Alexseyev, Vladimir 
Stepanovich; Kostyukov, Igor Olegovich. See also EURO. SCRUTINY COMM., FORTY-FIRST REPORT, 
2017–19, HC 301 (UK). 
167 Julian Borger & Patrick Wintour, Western Allies Expel Scores of Russian Diplomats Over Skripal 
Attack, GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/26/ four-eu-states-
set-to-expel-russian-diplomats-over-skripal-attack.  
168 See FOREIGN AFF. COMM., FRAGMENTED AND INCOHERENT: THE U.K.’S SANCTIONS POLICY, 
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perpetrator may, in reality, be a non-state person or group with no discernible 
assets or intention to travel to the sanctioning jurisdiction. In the case of direct 
state responsibility, the victim state will suffer from reluctance to identify the 
alleged villains since there are always pressing needs to maintain dialogue with 
them about other issues of public policy. It is also notable that all the foregoing 
are unilateral sanctions systems, not endorsed by the United Nations, which also 






Law is an imperfect instrument in cyberspace, especially when responding 
to transnational cyberattacks. It must contend not only with the difficult 
attributes of transnationality, instantaneity, and accessibility, but also must 
overcome an overlay of political calculations, which make courtrooms an 
unappealing venue for the settling of international scores. Resolutions, such as 
diplomatic discussions, containment through surveillance, and even retaliation 
by way of countermeasures, often seem more appealing. 
It follows that a broad array of countermeasures should be considered. The 
EU Commission has placed twenty-two measures into its toolbox against hybrid 
threats,169 and these did not preclude building resilience, detecting, preventing, 
and responding to the threats via Member States’ domestic law, which remains 
the predominant instrument. The European Commission is surely right to 
conclude that “a whole-of-society approach—government, civil society, private 
sector, including, inter alia, media and online platforms—is at the core of our 
counter-hybrid policies.”170 But it recognizes that responding to threats lies 
predominantly with member states, as it is intrinsically linked to national 
security and defense policies. At that level, much work has been done with 
legislation for criminal offenses and forms of civil action, but the law in action 




169 Report on the Implementation of the 2016 Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats and 
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Threats Brussels, at 1, COM (2019) 200 final (May 29, 2019), https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/economic-
relations-connectivity-innovation/63378/report-implementation-2016-joint-framework-countering-
hybrid-threats-and-2018-joint_en.  
170 Id. at 25.  
